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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The main objective of modern merger policy, in North America as well as in the European
Union, is to control - i.e. block or clear with conditions - mergers and acquisitions that
otherwise would result in anti-competitive eﬀects. The theoretical rationale for this policy
is that market concentration has an eﬀect on ﬁrms’ ability to exercise market power in a way
that harm consumers. More precisely, a merger of competitors could give the newly formed
entity a unilateral incentive to raise its price above the pre-merger level and, alternatively,
reduce the costs and diﬃculties in reaching a tacit or explicit agreement bewteen the
remaining competitors. These two categories are commonly referred to as ”unilateral” and
”coordinated” eﬀects.
The latter of these categories, i.e. the risk of collusion, has been at the core of American
merger control for years. For instance, in 1986, the inﬂuential judge and scholar Richard
Posner declared that the ”ultimate issue” in US merger control is to determine whether a
transaction ”is likely to hurt consumers, as by making it easier for the ﬁrms in a market
to collude, expressively or tacitly”.1 In recent years, US antitrust authorities have shown
a new interest in how the agencies should analyze and prove coordinated eﬀects in merger
cases (see, for instance, James, 2002 and Kolasky, 2002).
Correspondingly, in European merger control coordinated eﬀects theories (or, in the
terminology of European merger control, ”collective dominance”) have grown more impor-
tant, as is manifested in, for instance, the European horizontal merger guidelines (2004).2
Since the Nestlé/Perrier3 case in 1994, mergers have more frequently been challenged on
the basis that they might signiﬁcantly impede competition in the European market due to
coordinated eﬀects.4
Given the policy relevance and wide application of coordinated eﬀects theories in merger
1 Hospital Corp of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986).
2 ”Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers” (2004), available at DG Competition’s
web-page http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/.
3 M.190 - Nestlé/Perrier, Oﬃcial Journal L 356 , 05/12/1992 p. 0001-0031
4 Important cases include Kali&Salz (M. 308), Gencor/Lonhro (M. 619) and Airtours/First
Choice (M. 1524).
2control, both in the USA and the EU, it is somewhat surprising that very few studies try
to empirically evaluate the coordinated eﬀects of mergers.5 This paper is an attempt at
(partly) ﬁlling this gap by examining collusion and coordination in the Swedish gasoline
retail market during the period 1986-2002.
We ﬁrst estimate a variety of demand speciﬁcations and compute the price-elasticity
of demand (cf. Geneovese and Mullin, 1998). Then, using a precise measure of the lower
bound of the marginal cost (taxes plus the spotmarket price for premium gasoline), we com-
pute an upper bound of the Lerner index. Proceeding in several steps, an initial analysis
examines conduct by investigating the correlation between the Lerner index and price elas-
ticity, contrasting periods without and with signiﬁcant merger activity. Then, by directly
measuring conduct as the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index, we proceed to directly estimat-
ing the relationship between conduct and concentration, using the time-series variation
of conduct to examine coordinated eﬀects of four signiﬁcant mergers and one important
divestiture during the period 1993-1999.6
More speciﬁcally, we estimate a non-linear relationship between conduct and HHI (i.e.
the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index) and explicitly test if an increase in concentration results
in more accommodating output responses by competitors in the post-merger market. From
theory, we show the latter to be equivalent to testing if the elasticity of market conduct
with respect to the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index exceeds unity. Finally, we also estimate the
post-merger eﬀects on a case-by-case basis to assess the relevance of additional - possibly
unobserved - factors.
The empirical approach in this paper diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the technique used by
antitrust agencies to assess collusion and coordinated eﬀects in merger cases. The conven-
tional approach to coordinated eﬀects has been to check whether the market meets the
necessary conditions for tacit or express collusion (Europe Economics, 2001). For instance,
5 Coleman, Meyer and Scheﬀman (2003) is an interesting exception. They describe how the FTC
assessed coordinated eﬀects in the cruise ships merger investigation.
6 The ﬁve transactions are: Statoil’s acquisition of British Petroleum in 1993, OK Petroleum’s
acquisition of Texaco in 1994, OK Petroleum’s dissolution into OK and Preem in 1995, Norsk
Hydro’s acquisition of Uno-X in 1996 and, ﬁnally, the merger between OK and Kuwait in 1999.
3the European Commission considers a number of factors in its assessment of coordinated
eﬀects and collective dominance, including price and cost transparency, low rate of in-
novation and technological development, inelastic and stable demand, market maturity,
product and ﬁrm homogeneity, similar cost structures, symmetric market shares, struc-
tural links and multi-market contact (see the European Commission’s contribution to the
OECD round table on ”Oligopoly”, 1999).7 In addition, American as well as European
antitrust agencies consider increased concentration to be important in facilitating collusion
(see, for instance, the US contribution to the OECD roundtable, 1999, p 204).
In recent years, scholars - as well as practitioners - have suggested that the risk of
collusion might increase as a result of a merger due to other changes than increased con-
centration. Baker (2002) argues that antitrust authorities should put particular focus on
the analysis of maverick ﬁrms. He suggests that a merger removing a maverick could
increase the risk of collusion, while it may be reduced by a transaction creating a maver-
ick. Sheﬀman and Coleman (2003) and Dick (2002) add that a merger can make collusion
more likely, perfect or complete by creating a market leader, making the market more
transparent, limiting innovation or making suppliers, products and costs more symmetric.8
Considering the factors that have been regarded as conducive to collusion according to
the traditional approach and modern theoretical analysis of collusion, we would argue the
Swedish gasoline retail market to be a good natural laboratory. Initially, it may be noted
that from a policy perspective, mergers in gasoline markets have been of great interest
to antitrust authorities.9 More importantly, from an empirical perspective, it is indeed a
7 A recent survey of US merger cases by William Kolasky (2002) shows that US authorities
use a similar list of factors and market characteristics in practice, which includes such factors
as availability of key information concerning market conditions, the extent of ﬁrm and product
heterogeneity, pricing and marketing practices, characteristics of buyers and sellers and typical
transactions as well as previous express collusion. Recently, Sheﬀman and Coleman (2003) suggested
that the value of the ”checklist” can be questioned on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
8 A recent theoretical paper by Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002) also shows that a transaction
resulting in a more symmetric distribution of production capacities may increase the risk of collu-
sion. Earlier contributions by Palfrey (1991), Verboven (1997) and Rotschild (1999) show that a
change to more similar production costs facilitates collusion in dynamic oligopolies.
9 The Federal Trade Commission in the US has an extensive history of investigating mergers
4market which meets many of the criteria considered conducive to ﬁrms’ ability to reach
and sustain a collusive equilibrium. For instance, the product is homogenous, demand is
relatively stable over time and seasonal variation is fairly predictable, variable costs are to
a large extent similar for all ﬁrms and ﬂuctuations in the variable cost are transparent, the
list price is highly transparent, the market has an intermediate concentration level with the
Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index ﬂuctuating in the range of 1500 to 2000 and, ﬁnally, the bar-
riers to entry are relatively high as a new entrant would have to establish a comparatively
large network of gasoline stations to become a signiﬁcant competitor in the market.
Despite all these factors conducive to collusive behavior, we ﬁnd no robust evidence of
mergers leading to coordinated eﬀects. Depending on the structural form of the demand
function, we ﬁnd increased concentration to have little impact, no impact or even to increase
competition. These results relate in an interesting way to previous studies of collusion in
the gasoline retail market. Using micro level data from Vancouver in Canada, Slade (1987
and 1992) ﬁnds that prices were strictly higher that prices predicted by a one-shot Nash
equilibrium model but, nevertheless, substantially lower that the optimal level for a perfect
cartel. In other words, ﬁrms were able to sustain some but far from perfect collusion.
The analysis in this paper is also related to Nevo (2001) and a recent paper by Slade
(2003). They use structural methods to assess the level of collusion in the US ready-to-
eat cereal market and the UK brewing industry, respectively. More speciﬁcally, they use
implied margins from an estimated model with diﬀerentiated goods and non-cooperative
in petroleum markets. According to its former chairman Robert Pitofsky (2001), the Bureau of
Competition at the FTC has spent almost one-third of its total enforcement budget on investigations
in energy industries in recent years. Notable, for instance, is the review of the Exxon/Mobil merger
in 1999, which resulted in a historically large retail divestiture - the sale of 2,431 Exxon and Mobil
gas stations in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions, and in California, Texas and Guam (Exxon
Corp., C-3907 (Nov. 30, 1999)). Other recent mergers involving oil companies in the US include
BP/Amoco (1999) and Shell/Texaco (1998). In the European Union, on the other hand, the merger
task force has reviewed a number of transactions involving gasoline companies. In 1999, the review
of the merger between Totalﬁna and Elf (M. 1628 - Totalﬁna/Elf Aquitaine (09.02.2000) OJ L143/1
(29 June 2001) pp 682-786), two rival French oil companies, the Commission obtained a divestiture
of 70 petrol stations, thereby avoiding that the company would control gasoline retail prices on
French highways.
5price competition, to decomposed accounting margins in ”collusive” and ”non-collusive”
components.
The analysis in this paper, on the other hand, focuses on a slightly diﬀerent problem.
The question addressed in this paper is to what extent a merger results in more collusive
behavior. Consequently, we are interested in the behavioral change due to mergers rather
than the level of collusion as such.
Our results succinctly illustrate that a ”checklist” approach to asses collusion and
coordinated eﬀects of mergers is problematic. For one thing, the conditions for tacit and
express collusion are, in theory, necessary but not suﬃcient. The empirical relevance of
diﬀerent factors in a speciﬁc case is consequently hard to determine (see Dick, 2002).
Therefore, we draw the conclusion that the value of a ”checklist” in merger control can
be questioned on both theoretical and empirical grounds; a conclusion similar to the less
formal point made in a recent paper by Sheﬀman and Coleman, 2003.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents facts about the retail
market for gasoline and M&A activity in the Swedish market for gasoline in the 1990’s.
In addition, market conditions are discussed from the perspective of a simple ”checklist”.
Section 3 starts with the theoretical framework for our analysis and proceeds with the
empirical analysis. Finally, section 4 puts our results in a policy context and concludes.
2 The retail market for gasoline in Sweden
The Swedish retail market for gasoline is a good candidate for an empirical analysis of co-
ordinated eﬀects of mergers and acquisitions. First and foremost, during the last decades,
the market has been subject to signiﬁcant consolidation. Four major acquisitions and one
divestiture occurred during the period 1993-1999. However, except for these transactions,
market shares remained fairly stable during the periods between the large transactions.
Consequently, it may be argued that any empirical link between variation in market con-
centration and ﬁrm conduct is directly related to the mergers and acquisitions occurring
in the industry. Second, and of equal importance, the retail market for gasoline satisﬁes
6most conditions considered to be necessary for coordinated eﬀects. Moderate concentra-
tion, repeated interaction as well as transparency suggest that structural changes could
make collusion more likely or eﬃcient.
In addition, the size of the market contributes to the policy relevance of the competitive
conditions in this industry. It may be noted that consumption of gasoline at the retail level
constitutes a signiﬁcant share of total private consumption in Sweden. In 2001, the total
retail value of gasoline sold at gasoline stations was SEK 51 billion (approximately $5
billion), which corresponds to approximately 2.3 percent of GDP or 4.7 % of the private
consumption in Sweden. Translated into quantities, the consumption in 2001 was 5 418
000 metric tons.10 Table A.1 gives some summary statistics of the Swedish retail market
for gasoline.
2.1 Market concentration and M&A activity
As previously noted, the retail market for gasoline in Sweden has been subject to signiﬁcant
structural changes, which has resulted in a moderately high concentration. A number of
mergers, acquisitions and divestitures has altered the concentration as well as the identities
of the main players in the market. Table 1 lists all signiﬁcant transactions during the period
1985-2002. It is worth noting that the market was less concentrated in the early 1980’s,
with nine large retail companies, as compared to the late 1990’s, when six companies
accounted for 96-98 % of the sales.
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the Hirschman-Hirfendahl index from 1986 to 2002.
During the late 1980’s, the HHI was relatively stable, just above 1400. In 1993-1994, the
concentration (measured with HHI) increased by almost 240 points when Statoil acquired
British Petroleum and another 250 points when OK Petroleum merged with Texaco. In
1995, the concentration decreased after a dissolution of OK Petroleum into OK and Preem.
10 R e l a t e dt ot h en u m b e r so fc a r si nt r a ﬃc, a total of 4 018 500 cars in 2001, the consumption
of gasoline per car in traﬃc was 1 348 liters per annum. This is a lower bound on the mean
consumption per car since approximately 5.1% of the cars in the pool are diesel (automotive gas),
which suggests the average consumption per gasoline car to be closer to 1 420 liters in 2001.
7Table 1: Market structure: signiﬁcant transactions, 1985-2002.
Year Month Event Market share of
merging (dissolving) ﬁrms
1985 January Shell acquires Bilisten NA
Norsk Hydro enters through the NA
acquisition of Mobil.
Statoil enters through the acquisition of Esso NA
1986 January Merger between OK and SP 0.20
1991 January Statoil and BP station swap
1993 October Statoil acquires BP 0.26
1994 August Merger between OK and Texaco 0.25
1995 October OK and Preem dissolved (0.13 and 0.14)
1996 May Norsk Hydro acquires Uno-X 0.11
1999 January Merger between OK and Q8 0.26
Later, the concentration increased by 350 points after the merger of OK and Q8 in 1999.
It is also worth noting that the C4 ratio follows a similar pattern. C4 was approximately
67 % during the period 1986-1992, increased to 75 % in 1994, decreased to 68 % in 1995,
increased by more than ten percentage points to 79 % in 1999 and fell to 75 % in 2000-
2001.11
11 In 2001, Statoil of Norway had a market share of 23 percent. It is one of the world’s largest
net sellers of crude oil and has Scandinavian reﬁneries in Kalundborg, Denmark and Monstad,
Norway. Shell had a market share of 13.5 percent. It has Scandinavian reﬁneries in Gothenburg,
Sweden and Frederica, Denmark. OK-Q8 with a market share of 26.4 percent is owned by OK and
Kuwait Petroleum International, which has a reﬁnery in Europoort, Netherlands. Norsk Hydro had
a market share of 11.6 percent. It is a major international oil producer and it has reﬁning capacity
at Scanraﬀ in Lysekil, Sweden. Preem, with a market share of 11 percent, has signiﬁcant reﬁning
capacity at two Swedish reﬁneries in Lysekil and Gothenburg. Finally, Jet had a market share of
10.1 percent. It is the trade name for ConocoPhillips gasoline stations in Scandinavia and is a chain
of unmanned/automatic gas stations. ConocoPhillips is the sixth largest global oil company and it



















Figure 1: The Herﬁndahl index 1986-2002.
2.2 Market conditions
The traditional approach to coordinated eﬀects in merger cases is to analyze the market
characteristics and the conditions for collusion. This section presents several facts about
the retail market for gasoline that could be considered conducive to coordinated eﬀects of
mergers:
(i) The gasoline market is transparent. Firms set a list price per liter posted at the
pump. This price is set on a nationwide basis with minor adjustments to local conditions.
Rebates to private customers in loyalty programmes are more or less standardized, and
changes are transparent since all ﬁrms participate in each other’s loyalty programmes.
Individual rebates to large customers are less transparent, but also of less signiﬁcance for
the total market.
(ii) The demand for gasoline is stable and predictable. The physical product is homoge-
nous. In the last decade, the consumption of gasoline per month has declined slightly to
9approximately 450 000 MT per month. The seasonal pattern is very predictable, with high
demand during the summer, low demand in the winter and intermediate demand during
the fall and the spring.
(iii) Market demand for gasoline is inelastic. During the period 1995-2000, the real
retail price of gasoline increased by 18 percent while consumption declined by 7%, which
indicates a price-elasticity of around 0.4 in absolute terms.
(iv) A large share of costs is identical for all ﬁrms. In 2001, approximately two thirds
of the Swedish retail price could be attributed to speciﬁc taxes and the spot market price
of premium unleaded gasoline with delivery in North Western Europe. In addition, 20
percent of the retail price was value added tax.
(v) The rate of innovation and technological development is slow. There has been a
gradual but slow rationalization at the retail level in the last 20 years. The total number
of gas stations of the main retail companies has declined by approximately 500 stations
during the period 1987 to 2001.
(vi) Five of the largest retail companies have been prosecuted for an explicit agreement
in November 1999 on the terms of a technical rebate adjustment, i.e. a simultaneous re-
duction of the pump price and rebates (Case T-9902-00 Swedish Competition Authority
./. Norsk Hydro et al).
To summarize, it could be argued that the retail market for gasoline in Sweden has
many of the characteristics theoretically considered to be conducive to collusion. In the
next section, however, we shall use empirical methods (rather than theoretical criteria)
to evaluate the relationship between mergers and collusion. We want to argue that this
analysis will indicate the empirical relevance of simple ”checklists” in merger control. It will




We shall treat gasoline as a homogenous product. Since all ﬁrms sell a physically identical
product, this is a reasonable approximation despite some diﬀerentiation in the distribution
of gasoline. Thus, the market demand for gasoline can be written as:
Qt = Q(Pt,Xt), (1)
where Qt is aggregate demand for gasoline in period t, Pt is the consumption price for
gasoline and Xt is a vector of demand shifters such as consumption, the stock of cars etc.





Pt(Qt)qit − Ci(qit,wt), (2)
where τ is the value added tax, qit the output of ﬁrm i and C(qit,w t) is the total cost of















Qt is the conjectural variation elasticity. Having only
market-level data, we need to rewrite (3). We multiply (3) with the market share of ﬁrm
i, si =
qit











sicit(wt) is a weighted average of marginal costs12 and N the number of
ﬁrms. We shall refer to θt =
N X
i=1
sitθit as the (weighted) average industry conduct, which
12 We follow Verboven and Bettendorf (2000) and assume that the cost function can be written
as Cit(qit,wt)=cit(wt)qit + Gi(wt),w h e r eGi(wt) are ﬁxed costs.
11is our measure of the degree of competition in period t.D e ﬁning the average Lerner index
Lt:
Lt =
Pt − (1 + τ)c(wt)
Pt
(5)









Qt is the market price elasticity of demand. Given the price elasticity
 (Pt), which can be obtained from (1), average conduct θ can be estimated as a (possibly
time-varying) parameter from (6). The estimates of θ can then be used to make assessments
of the collusive eﬀects of mergers.





















dqit as the total output re-
sponse by the competitors to an increase in volume by ﬁrm i (following Jacquemine and
Slade, 1989) and rewrite (7) as:
θt =( 1+Rt)HHIt. (8)
Given a speciﬁc functional form of the total output response Rt,w h i c hm a yd e p e n do nt h e
level of concentration as measured by the Hirshman-Herﬁndahl index HHIt, equation (8)
can be estimated by replacing industry conduct θt with the price-elasticity-adjusted Lerner
index, L t:
L t =[ 1+Rt(HHI)]HHIt, (9)
since θt = L t = Lt ·  (Pt) holds from (6).
Following Jacquemine and Slade (1989), coordinated eﬀects of a merger can now be
deﬁned as the increasing eﬀectiveness of, or risk for, ”conscious parallel behavior”, i.e.
R0
t (HHIt) > 0 .D e ﬁning the elasticity η = dL 
dHHI
HHI
L  (omitting the time index), the










12Consequently, the estimates of η can be used to assess the eﬀects of mergers.
3.2 Demand for gasoline
Our purpose is to examine how increased concentration induced by mergers aﬀects industry
conduct. Generally, the results will crucially depend on the estimated demand elasticities
ε(Pt) from the demand function (1). Therefore, we devote some eﬀort to estimating demand
functions. More speciﬁcally, we estimate four diﬀerent speciﬁcations: linear, log-linear,
exponential and quadratic demand:
Qt = α0 + α1Pt + α
0
2Xt + ξt (11)
qt = α0 + α1pt + α
0
2xt + ξt (12)
Qt = α0 + α1P2
t + α
0
2Xt + ξt (13)
Qt =e x p
³





where Qt is the quantity of gasoline consumed, Pt is the price of gasoline, Xt are demand
shifters and lower case letters denote logs of variables. Control variables include consump-
tion per capita (CONSt), the number of private cars in traﬃc( CARSt), and the number
of private cars temporarily deregistered (CARSDt). We also add a time trend (TREND)
and a set of dummy variables DM,d e ﬁned for each month to account for seasonal variation.
The linear demand function (11) allows for varying price elasticities, but has a constant
slope-coeﬃcient. The log-linear demand function (12), on the other hand, yields a con-
stant price elasticity. Finally, the last two demand functions, (13)-(14), allow for varying
elasticity, as well as a varying slope coeﬃcient.
Table A.2 provides summary statistics. We have monthly data during the period Jan-
uary, 1980 to June, 2002 for the price and quantities sold of gasoline, oil price, and the
number of private cars in traﬃc and the number of temporarily deregistered cars. The two
latter series are translated into an index, using 1985 January as the base period. Quarterly
data is used on current household per capita consumption. Finally, the gasoline prices and
13oil prices are in Swedish kronor per liter. Gasoline input price data, as measured by the
Rotterdam FOB spot market price of premium unleaded gasoline, is available from June,
1985.
Table 2 shows the result of estimating demand speciﬁcations (i)-(iv). All regressions
make use of instrumental variables for the gasoline price, i.e. a two-stage least squares
method is employed, since a contemporaneous correlation between error term and gasoline
prices may be suspected. Diﬀerent types of shocks, which aﬀect the error term ξ, can also
aﬀe c tt h eg a s o l i n ep r i c e s ,s i n c et h e s ea r es e n s i tive to world-wide shocks such as political
crises, wars etc. We instrument the price of gasoline with the oil price and direct taxes,
which are highly correlated with prices. Using the oil price rather than the input price for
gasoline allows us to make use of the full sample period in estimating the demand functions,
since gasoline input prices are only available from 1985.13
All speciﬁc a t i o n sa r ee s t i m a t e dw i t hh i g hp r e c i s i o n . T h eﬁt is generally high, and
most coeﬃcients are highly signiﬁcant with the expected signs. In particular, we ﬁnd the
price of gasoline to be signiﬁcantly negatively related to demand, while disposable income
(proxied for by consumption per capita), CONS a n dt h es t o c ko fc a r s ,CARS, increases
the demand for gasoline. As expected, the diﬀerent speciﬁcations generate some variation
in the estimated price elasticities of demand.
To test for parameter stability, we tested for recursive least square coeﬃcients, which
detected no shift in the estimated parameters. We also applied a Chow test to examine
whether there is a structural shift in the estimated parameters in the demand functions
before and after the introduction of VAT in March 1990. All demand functions show signs
of a change in the estimated parameters before and after March 1990, a problem further
discussed below.
13 While this improves our estimates because the standard errors are smaller, using the shorter
period with the input prices yields qualitatively the same results.
14Table 2: Estimation of demand.
Speciﬁcation (i) (ii) (iiii) (v)
Demand: Linear Logaritmic Quadratic Expon.
PRICE -0.067*** -0.238*** -0.005*** -0.056***
(-7.30) (-5.36) (-8.77) (-7.31)
GDPC 0.227*** 0.486*** 0.191*** 0.195***
(4.48) (9.24) (3.56) (4.58)
CARS 1.032*** 0.571*** 0.925*** 0.807**
(3.97) (5.36) (3.72) (-3.72)
CARSD -0.218*** -0.161*** -0.171*** -0.172***
(-4.63) (-4.69) (-3.69) (-4.37)
TREND -0.024*** -0.016*** -0.014** -0.019***
(-4.14) (-5.77) (-2.38) (-4.03)
CONST 46.689*** 56.329*** 28.561** 37.086
(4.16) (5.99) (2.39) (3.97)
R2 84.11 87.04 85.04 83.71
F 106.48*** 125.65*** 124.41*** 87.88***
Obs 275 275 275 275
1Note: *, **, *** indicate the signiﬁcance at the ten percent, ﬁve percent and one percent
level, respectively.
3.3 Investigating the Lerner index
We are now ready to proceed with the analysis of the relationship between mergers and
collusion. Thus, we begin by examining the evolution of the Lerner index, Lt.F o r t h i s
purpose, let the marginal cost c(wt) in (5) be:
c(wt)=c0 + TAXt + PSPOTt, (15)
where TAXt is direct taxes on gasoline in sek/liter, PSPOTt is the Rotterdam spot market
price14 in sek/liter and c0 contains several unobserved components of marginal cost (e.g.
labor and transportation cost), for which we have no data. We shall measure marginal
14 This input price is multiplied by 0.755, which is a conversion factor.
15cost directly as the sum of direct taxes TAXt plus the spot price of unleaded premium
gasoline, i.e. c(wt)=TAXt + PSPOTt. As noted above, these components (including
VAT) account for 88 percent of the retail price of gasoline on average but nevertheless, this
is a lower bound as we shall initially assume c0 =0 .
Equation (6) represents a theoretical relationship between the Lerner index Lt and
price elasticity  (Pt), where θ indicates the degree of competition. To investigate this





from the demand equations (11)-(14). Figure 2 illustrates this relationship for the the
linear, quadratic- and exponential demand functions. Upon inspection, the data seems to
roughly cluster into three separate periods.
First, note that within the pre-VAT benchmark period, i.e. observations occurring be-
fore the introduction of VAT in March 1990 (indicated with 0:s in Figure 2), the Lerner
index and price elasticity seem virtually unrelated, which may indicate perfect competi-
tion, or the use of some other price setting behavior than (4). In contrast, for observations
occurring during the merger period, i.e. observations occurring after the merger between
Statoil and BP in 1993 (indicated with M:s in Figure 2), there seems to be a clear nega-
tive relationship between the Lerner index and price elasticity, suggesting an imperfectly
competitive market. Finally, within the post-VAT benchmark period, i.e. observations oc-
curring after the introduction of VAT in 1990, but before the Statoil and BP merger in
1993 (indicated with 1:s in Figure 2), there does not seem to be any clear-cut relationship.
However, at least for the quadratic and the exponential demand speciﬁcations, aggregating
observations in the post-VAT benchmark and merger periods, there seems to be a rather
similar overall pattern.
To more formally investigate these patterns, we turn to estimations. Note that (6)
represents a non-linear relationship between Lt and  (Pt). However, by rewriting this
expression using the inverse price elasticity ρ(Qt)= 1
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Figure 2: The Lerner index and Price Elasticity.
17error term, we have a simple linear regression to estimate15
Lt = β0 + θρ(Qt)+εt, (16)
where we also include monthly dummies to control for seasonal eﬀects and apply robust
standard errors since ρ(Qt) is estimated.
We estimate (16) separately for all three periods and all demand speciﬁcations. The
results are given in Table 3 and roughly conﬁrm the visual image of the evolution of conduct
in Figure 2. In the pre-VAT benchmark period, we cannot reject θ =0for any speciﬁcation.
For the linear speciﬁcation, the estimated conduct in the post-VAT benchmark period is
0.027, whereas for the quadratic and exponential speciﬁcations, the estimated conduct is
0.017 and 0.04, respectively. All these estimates are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, but
the ﬁt of these regressions is generally quite low and F-tests reject the joint signiﬁcance of
parameters. Examining the estimates for conduct during the merger period, we can note
that this period produces the highest conduct, irrespective of speciﬁcation, ranging from
0.035-0.069. While these estimates suggest conduct to be rising over time and that this
process may be related to the increase in concentration occurring between periods, there
are several caveats.
One caveat is the structural break in demand upon the introduction of VAT in March
1990. We examined its impact by re-estimating the demand equations (11)-(14) before
and after the introduction of VAT. This leads to a smaller estimate of the slope-coeﬃcient
α1 in the post-VAT period, implying a less elastic demand at that time. However, the
relationship between Lt and  (Pt) is not qualitatively aﬀected, since  (Pt) (or its inverse
 (Qt)) is simply re-scaled.16
15 We also estimated this regression using instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity
bias as the price elasticity might be endogenous. Instrumenting with lags of the price elasticity did
not qualitatively change the results, however.






Q,w h e r ez indicates
the pre- or post-VAT period. Increasing α1 for the pre-VAT observations then simply pushes those
observations to the right in Figure 2, while reducing α1 for the post-VAT observations shifts such
observations to the left.
18Another concern is the estimate of the constant term, β0. Note that by comparing
(6) and (16), theory would suggest that ˆ β0 =0 . In contrast, in Table 3, we observe that
while ˆ β0 is decreasing over time, it is estimated signiﬁcantly diﬀerently from zero in all
speciﬁcations.17 To some extent, this may be explained by the omission of the unobserved
cost component c0 in (15). From (5), (15) and (16), it follows that β0 =
(1+τ)c0
Pt ;t h a ti s ,
the estimate of the constant term ˆ β0 picks up the average (relative) measurement error
arising from omitting c0 in (5). Solving for c0 and taking the average for the respective
time periods, we ﬁnd the unobserved marginal cost component to be roughly SEK 0.80
in the pre-VAT and post-VAT benchmark periods, while this component is SEK 0.47 in
the merger period. As discussed in the robustness section 3.5 below, we estimate that
the unobserved component is approximately 0.4 SEK, which is also consistent with rough
estimates available from industry sources. This suggests that β0 may be over-estimated
in (16) during the pre-merger periods, which may bias the estimate of industry conduct
downwards. One reason is that since β0 =
(1+τ)c0
Pt , estimates of β0 may decrease over time
if gasoline prices Pt increase faster than the unobserved component c0. As illustrated in
Figure 3, this may also have been the case since gasoline prices increase substantially due
to increased direct taxation and higher spot market prices, in particular in the later part
of the merger period. In addition, with greater variation in prices and demand elasticities,
the relationship in (16) is also better identiﬁed, as suggested by the superior overall ﬁta n d
the joint signiﬁcance of parameters shown in Table 3 for the merger period.
In brief, our results so far suggest that conduct is rising over time which could be related
to consolidation. We are nevertheless careful not to draw any deﬁnite conclusions based
on this ﬁnding due to a structural break in demand and due to the potential inﬂuence of
several unobserved components of marginal cost.
To further investigate whether increased concentration has resulted in less competitive
17 We also estimated a piece-wise linear regression of (16), which allows for diﬀerent intercepts
and slopes during the three periods. Applying Wald tests, we could then conﬁrm that the average
conduct in the Merger period exceeds the level of conduct in the Benchmark period and that the
Lerner index is reduced over time.
19industry conduct, we now proceed to estimating conduct as a direct function of market
concentration (HHI). For this purpose, we turn to examining the elasticity adjusted Lerner
index.
Table 3: The relationship between the Lerner index and price elasticity.
Speciﬁcation (i) (ii) (iiii) (iv)
Demand: Linear Logaritmic Quadratic Expon.
Pre-VAT benchmark period: November 1985 - February 1990
ˆ θ -0.002 . -0.001 0.002
(-0.14) . (-0.18) (0.09)
Constant 0.190*** 0.200*** 0.187*** 0.193**
(2.40) (11.52) (3.78) (2.50)
R2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
F 0.59 0.66 0.59 0.59
Obs 52 52 52 52
Post-VAT benchmark period: March 1990 - September 1993
... . ˆ θ 0.027*** . 0.017*** 0.040***
(-3.36) . (-3.52) (3.48)
Constant 0.150*** 0.211 0.168*** 0.104***
(6.76) (19.62) (9.19) (3.24)
R2 0.40 0.18 0.42 0.18
F 1.68 0.60 1.79 1.76
Obs 43 43 43 43
Merger period: October 1993 - November 2002
... . ˆ θ 0.047*** . 0.035*** 0.069***
(12.26) . (13.54) 14.98
Constant 0.072*** 0.170 0.092*** 0.020**
(8.44) (29.91) (14.75) (2.02)
R2 0.63 0.06 0.67 0.67
F 13.73*** 0.52 16.64 19.96
Obs 110 110 110 110
1Note: *, **, *** indicate the signiﬁcance at the ten percent,
ﬁve percent and one percent level, respectively.





















Figure 3: The evolution of the price of gasoline and the measure of marginal cost in (5).
3.4 Investigating the elasticity adjusted Lerner index
The structural presumption in merger control implies that an increase in concentration
should result in less competition and an increased risk of collusion. In other words, there
should be a positive relationship between conduct and HHI. In section 3.1, we showed that
industry conduct θ could be directly measured by the elasticity adjusted Lerner index,
L t, and that a direct relation between conduct and concentration could also be derived.
For our empirical purposes, we assume there to exist a non-linear relationship between
the competitors’ output response and HHI, which takes the parametric functional form
Rt = αHHI
η−1
t − 1. Our measure of conduct in (9) can thus be written as:
L t = αHHI
η
t , (17)
21where α,η ≥ 0.18 Taking logs, we then obtain the following equation to be estimated:
lnL t =l nα + ηlnHHIt + εt, (18)
where εt is an error term. We include monthly dummies to control for seasonal variation
and since the dependent variable is estimated, robust standard errors are applied. Note
that from (10), coordinated eﬀects should imply that the elasticity of conduct with regard
to HHI should exceed unity, η>1, whereas non-cooperative Cournot implies α = η =1 .
In estimating (18), we need to control for the structural shift in demand found upon
the introduction of VAT; this will otherwise bias our estimate of η in (18). A shock will
directly aﬀect the dependent variable L t = Lt∗ (Pt),b ya ﬀecting  (Pt). To control for this
problem and isolate the inﬂuence on conduct from concentration, we only estimate (18)
on observations after VAT was introduced, i.e. we use data from March 1990-November
2002. This implies that we have roughly three years of data from the Post-VAT benchmark
period and roughly ten years of data from the merger period. We also re-estimate (18)
assuming clustered standard errors, since we have derived the Herﬁndahl-Hirshman index
by roughly combining yearly data on the market shares of market ﬁrms with information
on the date of the major transactions in Table 1 (clustered t-statistics are given below
the non-clustered t-statistics in square-brackets).19 Finally, we examine (18), making a
diﬀerent assumption of the unobserved component c0 in (15). Initially, we make the simple
assumption of c0 =0and then check whether the results change when making alternative
assumption of c0.
The results from estimating (18) are shown in Table 4, where a number of features can
be noted. The relationship between conduct and HHI crucially depends on the assumed
functional form of demand. Only the linear and quadratic demand functions reveal a
positive and signiﬁcant relationship. The logaritmic demand speciﬁcation shows conduct to
decrease in concentration, but this simply reﬂects the fact that the Lerner index decreases
18 This gives a slightly more general relationship than that of Willig (1991), where the relationship
is linear in HHI, i.e. θ = aHHI.
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Figure 4: Comparing predicted conduct and concentration.
23over time, since price elasticity does not vary with the log-linear demand function. As
concerns the exponential demand function, for which there is variation in price elasticity,
no evidence of a correlation between conduct and concentration is found.
For the demand speciﬁcations with a positive relationship, we ﬁnd weak eﬀects. While
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, the linear demand produces an estimate of ˆ η =0 .121 from
which we can reject a unity restriction using a Wald test. When re-estimating the relation-
ship, allowing for clustered standard errors, this estimate even turns out to be insigniﬁcant
as clustering considerably increases standard errors. The quadratic speciﬁcation produces
an estimate ˆ η =0 .975,w h i c hi ss i g n i ﬁcant both with and without clustering. Here, we
cannot reject the restriction η =1 , which suggests that changes in concentration lead to
changes in conduct in a way predicted by Cournot behavior. Hence, at most, we ﬁnd
unilateral eﬀects of mergers, while we can reject coordinated eﬀects.
Next, we examine the levels of predicted conduct. All speciﬁcations but quadratic
demand have negative constant terms. For instance, for the linear demand speciﬁcation,
the point estimate for lnα is -2.392, which is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the parameter value
i m p l i e db yC o u r n o tb e h a v i o r( i . e .l n α =0 ). This suggests the estimated level of conduct
ˆ L t to be low. This is also in illustrated in Figure 4, where we plot predicted conduct
ˆ L t from the linear, quadratic- and exponential demand functions. For comparison, we
also plot the actual values of our measure direct of conduct L t, the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl
index HHIt (which should equal conduct under pure Cournot competition) as well as our
direct estimate of conduct from the Lerner index in (16), ˆ θ. Added are also predictions of
a case-by-case estimation of L t,l a b e l e dˆ L t(case), which is discussed below.
All speciﬁcations generate substantially lower predicted values of conduct than expected
from non-cooperative Cournot behavior, i.e. ˆ L t < HHIt. The co-movement of ˆ L t and
HHIt mirrors the estimates of elasticity η in Table 4, where only the quadratic speciﬁ-
cation is sensitive to changes in concentration. The weak relation between conduct and
concentration is also directly evident from comparing the direct measure of conduct, L t
and HHIt.
An interesting observation is that while our direct estimate of conduct ˆ θ from (16)
24is smaller than the indirect estimate ˆ L t from (18), only the former reveals a signiﬁcant
increase in conduct for the merger period beginning in 1993. Section 3.3 suggested that
t h ei n c r e a s ei nˆ θ may be explained by the unobserved component, c0, in (15). In Table
5, we investigate how diﬀerent assumptions for c0 aﬀect the elasticity adjusted L t and
the estimates in (16) using the linear demand function. For comparison, speciﬁcation (i)
restates the results c0 =0 . In speciﬁcation (ii), we increase c0 =0 .40 SEK, which was
argued to be a reasonable estimate in section 3.3. Comparing speciﬁcations (i) and (ii),
estimates of elasticity η are almost identical. However, the estimates of lnα are now smaller
and the level of estimated conduct ˆ L t within the merger period is now very similar to the
direct estimates ˆ θ from (16), with an average of 0.05. In section 3.3, we showed that
the increase in estimated conduct from ˆ θ =0 .027 in the Post-VAT benchmark period to
ˆ θ =0 .047 in the merger period also implied that c0 would be around 0.80 SEK in the
former and 0.40 in the latter period. Using these numbers in speciﬁcation (iii), we ﬁnd a
strong increase in elasticity to ˆ η =2 .65, thereby indicating coordinated eﬀects. Predicting
the implied conduct ˆ L t,w eﬁnd that the average conduct during the benchmark period
is now 0.028, and the corresponding predicted average conduct during the merger period
is 0.049, which simply retrieves the above direct estimates, ˆ θ. However, restricting the
sample to the merger period in speciﬁcation (iv) leads to a sharp reduction to ˆ η =0 .308,
w h i c hi n d i c a t e sw e a ke ﬀects of higher concentration.
In all, this shows that the increase in estimated conduct found in section 3.3, is likely
to be driven by attributing a too high marginal cost to the benchmark period, and not by
an increase in concentration in the merger period.
It may also be the case that other unobserved factors associated with mergers aﬀect
conduct and increase the risk of collusion. Therefore, we ﬁnally examine the post-merger
eﬀects on a case-by-case basis, measuring the incremental contribution to conduct from
each merger and acquisition. Once more, we use the elasticity adjusted Lerner index as
our measure of conduct, retaining the assumption of c0 =0 . We estimate the following
25Table 4: Examining conduct and concentration.
Spec. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Restrictions:
Dem. Linear Logaritmic Quadratic Exponential Non-coop. Coordin.
Cournot eﬀects
η 0.121** -0.839*** 0.975*** 0.016 1 > 1
(2.06) (-12.21) (10.12) (0.32)
[1.27] [-4.56] [4.10] [0.17]
lnα -2.392*** -4.643*** -0.727*** -2.528*** 0 no restrict.
(-22.76) (-36.53) (-4.14) (-28.80)
. [-13.53] [-14.11] [-1.68] [-15.01]
R2 0.58 0.54 0.57 0.06
F 14.28*** 8.38*** 15.92*** 1.88
Obs. 153 153 153 153
Note: *, **, *** indicate the signiﬁcance at the one percent, ﬁve percent and ten percent level,
respectively. Values below estimate parentheses indicate t-values. Values below estimate
brackets indicate clustered t- values. Seasonal dummies are included in all speciﬁcations.
equation:
L t = β0 + β1DStatoil+BP + β2DOK+Texaco+ β3DOK−Preem (19)
+ β4DHydro+UnoX + β5DOK+Q8 + ξt.
β0 measures the average conduct during the pre-VAT benchmark period. DStatoil+BP is
then a dummy variable taking the value of one from October 1993, and zero prior to this
month. It measures the average eﬀect on conduct, due to the change in market structure as
a result of the Statoil/BP merger. DOK+Texaco, DOK−Preem, DHydro+UnoX and DOK+Q8
are similarly deﬁned. Finally, dummy variables DM deﬁned for each month control for
seasonal variation.
The results from estimating (19) are given in Table 6. These case-by-case estimates,
labeled ˆ L t(case) in Figure 4, generate very similar results as the functional relationship
presented in Table 4. The level of estimated conduct is once more very stable and only
the quadratic demand function reveals any eﬀects. Table 6 also shows the source of this
stability of conduct as it also contains estimates of (19) when replacing the dependent
variable with the Lerner index Lt and price elasticity ε(Pt). Irrespective of speciﬁcation,
26Table 5: Sensitivity of assumptions about the marginal cost using linear demand.
Spec. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Restrictions:
Assump. c0 =0 c0 =0 .4 c
Benchmark
0 =0 .8 c0 =0 .4
c
Merger
0 =0 .4 Only Merger Non-coop. Coordin.
period used Cournot eﬀects
η 0.121** 0.125 2.659*** 0.308*** 1 > 1
(2.06) (1.47) (12.59) (2.69)
[1.27] [0.87] [5.40] [1.43]
lnα -2.392*** -2.834*** 1.504*** -2.520*** 0 no restrict.
(-22.76) (-18.54) (3.94) (-12.68)
. [-13.53] [-14.11] [1.74] [-15.01]
R2 57.8 42.0 60.7 45.1
F 14.28*** 7.77*** 18.02*** 9.87***
Obs. 153 153 153 110
Note: *, **, *** indicate the signiﬁcance at the one percent, ﬁve percent and ten percent level,
respectively. Values below estimate parentheses indicate t- values. Values below estimate
brackets indicate clustered t- values. Seasonal dummies are included in all speciﬁcations.
the Lerner index Lt and price elasticity ε(Pt) tend to move in separate directions, oﬀ-
setting or reducing changes in our measure of conduct, L t = Lt · ε(Pt). The only merger
for which we do ﬁnd consistent signiﬁcant eﬀects is that between OK and Q8. However,
as can be seen from Table 6, the eﬀects are very modest.
In all, this shows very small eﬀects of mergers, which is the case irrespective of mea-
suring the eﬀect of increased concentration, or using a case-by-case approach. There is no
clear evidence of coordinated eﬀects.
T h ef a c tt h a te ﬀects of mergers on conduct are modest could be due to numerous factors.
The anti-competitive eﬀects could be mitigated by potential competition, eﬃciencies or,
alternatively, the presence of a maverick. It clearly highlights the importance of analyzing
all the relevant factors for competition in the assessment of post-merger eﬀects. The
measurement of post-merger eﬀects on a case-by-case basis reconﬁrms that a substantial
increase in concentration may or may not result in less competition (i.e. a higher level of
conduct). This reinforces the conclusion in the previous section that the change in HHI is
a poor predictor of post-merger conduct, at least at the present level of concentration.
27Table 6: Lerner-index, price elasticity and conduct.
Demand: Linear Quadratic Exponential Log-linear
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (ii)
Speciﬁcation: Lerner Elasticity Conduct Elasticity Conduct Elasticity Conduct Conduct
Benchmark 0.216*** 0.340*** 0.074*** 0.335*** 0.073*** 0.363*** 0.079*** 0.051***
(March 1990) (70.96) (37.23) (46.93) (24.70) (32.89) (70.79) (81.76) (70.96)
Statoil+BP -0.024*** 0.046*** 0.001 0.092*** 0.009*** 0.048*** 0.000 -0.006***
(Oct 1993) (-6.44) (5.31) (0.48) (6.66) (3.75) (8.57) (0.11) (-6.44)
OK+Texaco -0.005 -0.006 -0.003* -0.005 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(Aug 1994) (-1.37) (-0.97) (-1.93) (-0.61) (-1.53) (0.35) (-1.15) (-1.37)
OK-Preem -0.010*** 0.002 -0.004* 0.009 -0.003 0.007 -0.003** -0.002
(Oct 1995) (-2.71) (0.26) (-1.82) (0.76) (-1.17) (1.61) (-2.00) (-2.71)
Hydro+Unox -0.005 0.042*** 0.005*** 0.077*** 0.011*** 0.025*** 0.002 -0.001
(May 1996) (-1.37) (5.98) (2.52) (6.54) (4.05) (5.94) (1.34) (-1.37)
OK+Q8 -0.014*** 0.065*** 0.004*** 0.161*** 0.016*** 0.061*** 0.002*** -0.003***
(Jan 1999) (-5.33) (10.02) (2.95) (10.88) (8.15) (11.16) (2.39) (-5.33)
R2 0.77 0.83 0.62 0.82 0.70 0.82 0.12 0.877
F 90.91 43.81 14.55 34.86 20.28 37.70 2.23 30.91
Number of observations 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 1533.5 Robustness
We checked our results in a number of ways. First, we experimented with a host of
additional demand speciﬁcations, which did not qualitatively change our results. Further,
we also re-estimated demand before and after the introduction of VAT, and veriﬁed that
this procedure - as suggested in Section 3.3 - did not change our direct estimates of conduct
from (16). Using pooled and separate demand estimates, we also checked the inﬂuence on
our estimates on conduct of the elasticity adjusted Lerner index when including the pre-
VAT benchmark period in estimating (18). Controlling for VAT, the results in Table 4
were not aﬀected. However, the inﬂuence of concentration on conduct is over-estimated if
not controlling for VAT.
Furthermore, we also estimated the demand equation (1) and the supply equation (4)
simultaneously following Bettendorf and Verboven (2000).20 Using this procedure for the
full sample period between 1985-2000, we could check (i) the consistency of our two-stage
approach of separating demand and supply estimations, and (ii) in particular check our
assumptions on marginal cost. Across demand speciﬁcations, we then found conduct to
vary between 0.01 and 0.02, which is lower than the estimations using the elasticity-adjusted
Lerner index in (18), but roughly the same as the estimate of conduct when estimating
(16) over the full sample period 1985-2000.21 We estimate a unobserved component of
marginal cost of approximately 0.36 SEK per liter.
To further check our estimates, we calculated the VAT adjusted gross margin Pt −
(1 + τ)[TAXt + PSPOTt], which is illustrated in Figure 3 as the vertical distance be-
tween the price Pt and the (marginal cost measure) (1 + τ)[TAXt + PSPOTt].T a k i n g
the average over the post-VAT benchmark and merger period, we calculate this to be 1.39
SEK. From (5),(6) and (15), we can also calculate a predicted VAT-adjusted gross margin
20 A sw ea r ei n t e r e s t e di ne x a m i n i n gt h ee ﬀect on conduct of multiple transactions occurring
on the market, this approach was intractable for estimating the eﬀect on conduct of the separate
mergers, given the limited amount of data available.
21 The ﬁnding that the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index produces a higher value of conduct seems
to be in line with the ﬁndings reported by Genovese and Mullins (1998).
29using the fact that:




Inserting a conduct of θ =0 .05, which is roughly the average of the estimates from (16)
and (18), assuming the unobserved component of marginal cost to be c0 =0 .40 SEK,
calculating the price elasticity  (Pt) from the estimated linear demand (11), we can derive
that the average predicted gross margin was 1.41 in the period after VAT was introduced
in 1990. Thus, our estimates do quite well in predicting the data.
Figure 3 also gives an informal illustration of our results. Note that the VAT adjusted
gross margin remains remarkably stable over the period from 1990 and hence, virtually
unrelated to the variation in concentration implied by the investigated market transactions.
While we do observe an increase in the gross margin after VAT was introduced in 1990,
this cannot be attributed to increased concentration, since there was no such increase until
three year later.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
The empirical ﬁndings in this paper have implications for the assessment of collusion and
collective dominance in merger control. The gasoline retail market formally satisﬁes the
necessary conditions for tacit collusion, i.e. there are several possibilities of reaching a
consensus agreement, detecting and punishing deviations and the barriers to entry are
substantial.
The empirical analysis of several mergers during the period 1993 to 1999 highlights the
empirical problems associated with predicting the collusive eﬀects of mergers. We generally
ﬁnd the eﬀects of mergers to be small. In addition, the evidence is mixed and seems to
depend on many factors.
First, the results depend on the speciﬁcation of the demand function. A correct speci-
ﬁcation of the demand function can, therefore, be of vital importance for a correct assess-
ment. Second, we ﬁnd weak evidence of conduct to be related to market concentration
30which could, for instance, depend on insigniﬁcant market power at the present level of con-
centration or eﬃciencies oﬀ-setting the anti-competitive eﬀects of increased concentration.
We conclude that the most obvious and important observable measure of structural
change caused by a merger (i.e. a change in a concentration index such as HHI) has little
explanatory power in the assessment of collective dominance and coordinated eﬀects. Pre-
dicting the coordinated eﬀects of mergers ”out-of-sample” is, therefore, extremely diﬃcult
and associated with great uncertainty. This conclusion is also supported by the ﬁnding
that there is signiﬁcant variation in post-merger eﬀects from one merger to the other.
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33A Summary statistics
Table A.1: Summary statistics .
Market statistics 2001
Value (SEK million) 51 579
Value (US$m) 4 998
Share of GDP 2.3%
Share of private consumption 4.7%
Cars in traﬃc 4 018 500
Table A.2: Summary of raw data.
Number Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source:
Gasoline prices 275 6.18 2.15 2.71 10.54 SCB, SPI
(PRICE, Pt) Oanda
Private cars in traﬃc, 275 1.14 0.11 0.93 1.34 SCB
(CARS)
Cons per capita, 275 0.31 .011 .012 .049 SCB
(CONS)
Private cars deregistered 275 0.97 0.15 0.66 1.37 SCB
(CARSD)
Oilprice, 275 4.55 1.70 1.93 7.54 SCB, SPI, Swedish
(POIL) Central Bank
Direct taxes, 275 3.13 1.10 1.27 4.62 SPI
(TAX)
Gasoline input prices, 205 1.19 0.41 0.67 2.71 Platts Global
(PINPUT) Energi
Note: Platts classiﬁcation for gasoline prices is "prem unl CIF NWE Cargoes".
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